This paper studies the e¢ ciency of the search and matching model with training costs. I incorporate productivity enhancing …rm-speci…c skill training into the search and matching model of Pissarides (2000). I demonstrate that while the decentralized economy can be e¢ cient if training costs are not sunk at the time of wage determination, the decentralized economy is not e¢ cient due to a hold-up problem if training costs are sunk.
Introduction
Training is an important determinant of labor market outcome. Recently, the e¤ects of …rm-speci…c skill training on labor market dynamics have been studied in the literature of the search and matching model (Mortensen, 2000; Higashi, 2002; Miyamoto and Shirai, 2006, Shintoyo, 2007) . On the other hand, it is well known that labor market imperfection a¤ects training decisions and results in ine¢ ciencies in them (Malcomson, 1997) . These ine¢ ciencies in training decisions a¤ect labor market outcomes and thus the e¢ ciency of an economy. Analyzing the e¢ ciency properties of the search and matching model is interesting and relevant as it can inform us about the degree in which the equilibrium unemployment rate di¤ers from the e¢ cient unemployment rate. Furthermore, studying the e¢ ciency of models with labor market frictions and training costs is important not only from a theoretically point of view but also in quantitative studies where the Hosios (1990) condition is sometimes used. 1 For example, Pissarides (2009) and Silva and Toledo (2009a, b) calibrate the matching model with training cost by assuming that the Hosios condition holds.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the e¢ ciency of a labor market with matching frictions and …rm-speci…c skill training. For this purpose, I incorporate productivity enhancing …rm-speci…c skill training into the search and matching model of Pissarides (2000) .
In the model, a …rm can train its employee to increase the productivity of the match. When a …rm meets a worker, the …rm decides a level of training, incurring training costs that depend on the level of training. Since the investment is speci…c to the production unit, as Williamson (1975) and Grout (1984) emphasized, the incentives to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital may be reduced when a binding complete contract cannot be written and enforced before costs of speci…c investment are sunk. Thus, it is crucial to take into account the e¤ect of contract incompleteness on the …rm's training decision when the investment decision concerns speci…c capital. To grasp this, the model also allows for a varying degree of contract incompleteness by assuming that the training cost can be fully, partially or not sunk.
The main result is that the Hosios condition does not necessarily apply to this new 1 In the standard Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model in which wages are determined by Nash bargaining, the market equilibrium is e¢ cient if the worker's bargaining power equals the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment. This is well known as the Hosios (1990) 
The Model
In this study, I introduce productivity enhancing …rm-speci…c skill training into the model of Pissarides (2000) . In the model, a …rm can train its employee to increase the productivity of the match. When a …rm with a vacant job is matched with a worker, the …rm decides a level of training h, and incurs the training cost C(h). The cost function satis…es C 0 (h) > 0 and C 00 (h) > 0. The equilibrium level of training is denoted byh that an atomistic …rm would take as given when choosing its training level. A …rm-worker pair with training level h produces the output p + f (h), where p is a general productivity parameter which is common to all producing jobs and the production function f (h) represents the enhanced productivity due to …rm-speci…c skill training given to the matched worker. 2 The produc-
, and the Inada conditions:
An economy consisting of a continuum of workers normalized to one and a large number of identical risk-neutral …rms. Time is continuous. All agents are in…nitely lived and maximize the present discounted value of their income with discount rate r:
A …rm has only one job that can be either …lled or vacant. One job is …lled by one worker. A …rm can produce output if its job is …lled. If a …rm does not employ a worker, it posts a vacant job at ‡ow cost and searches for a worker. A worker can be either employed or unemployed. If a worker is employed, he produces output and earns an endogenous wage but cannot search for other jobs. If he is not employed, he gets a ‡ow utility z from non-market activity and searches for a job. When a …rm with a vacant job and an unemployed worker meet and start producing, it is said that job creation takes place. On the other hand, job separation takes place when a …lled job separates and stops producing. Separation occurs according to a Poisson process with exogenous arrival rate s. When job separation takes place, the worker becomes unemployed, while the …rm can either reopen a job as a new vacancy or withdraw from the labor market. 3 Free entry drives the expected present value of an open vacancy to zero.
The number of successful job matches per unit time is given by the matching function 2 The additive form of the output, p + f (h), is not crucial to results of the paper. For example, I can obtain the similar results by assuming output takes the form pf (h). However, the additive form of the output …ts the usual de…nition of training. Usually, training is considered as a method to improve workers' knowledge and skills. Without training, the workers can still produce but at lower productivity levels. 3 Note that in equilibrium …rms are indi¤erent between these two options.
M (u; v); where u is the number of unemployed workers and v is the number of vacancies.
The matching function M (u; v) is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, increasing in its arguments, and exhibits constant returns to scale. De…ne v=u as the tightness of the labor market. The rate at which a …rm with a vacancy is matched with a worker per unit of time The wages are determined through the Nash bargaining between a …rm and a worker over the share of expected future joint income, where the worker has bargaining power 2 [0; 1). It is assumed that, at the wage determination stage, the part of the training cost is considered as a loss in joint income.
I introduce a parameter 2 [0; 1] that captures the share of training costs which is speci…c and whose quasi rents cannot be protected by contract. The parameter can be thought of as corresponding to the degree of contract incompleteness. Note that setting = 1 implies that wages are bargained before the training cost is incurred; while = 0 implies that wages are bargained after the cost is incurred; i.e., the nature of the cost being sunk or not.
The burden of training costs is a¤ected by contractual incompleteness between the …rm and the worker. If a …rm and a worker can pre-commit to an enforceable wage contract that determines terms of employment contingent on future evens when they form a match,
i.e., the contract is complete, the worker shares the training costs by accepting a lower wage. In this case, training costs are not speci…c to the production unit, and a hold-up problem does not exist. On the other hand, if complete contracts are not enforceable, the bargain is about the wage only and the training costs are paid by the …rm alone and a hold-up problem does exist.
The timing of events and of decisions is as follows: …rst, when a …rm with a vacant job is matched with a worker, the …rm decides how much to invest in worker's …rm-speci…c skills. The …rm and the worker then bargain the wage. Depends on the degree of contract incompleteness, the part of training costs is taken into account by the …rm and the worker as a loss in their joint income when they bargain the wage.
Let the value of a vacant job be V and the value of a …lled job with training level h be J(h). They are characterized by the following Bellman equations:
and
I now turn to a worker's side. Let W (h) and U represent the value of an employed worker with training level h and an unemployed worker respectively. Then, the value functions for the workers are given by
Note that the training level h of an atomistic …rm has no impact on the worker's fallback position U , which depends on the equilibrium level of training. In other words, h corresponds to the best response by an atomistic …rm to the symmetric equilibrium pro…le of strategies where all …rms chooseh. The equilibrium is indeed de…ned by h =h, buth thereby U are taken as given when the …rm chooses its optimal training level.
In equilibrium, all pro…t opportunities from new jobs are exploited, so that the following free entry condition holds:
The wages are determined through the Nash bargaining between a …rm and a worker over the share of expected future joint income. The wage is determined by the following equation
Note that when = 1, the training costs are not sunk when the wage is determined. On the other hand, when = 0, the training costs are completely sunk and are not considered as a loss in joint income.
The solutions to this optimization problem, w(h), must satisfy the following …rst-order
I de…ne the total surplus from a match with training level h as S(h) J(h) + W (h) U C(h). Adding (2) and (3) gives
A …rm chooses the training level h to maximize the present-discounted value of its income, J(h) V C(h), at the moment of job creation. Since J(h) = (1 )S(h) + C(h) from the wage sharing rule (6), an atomistic …rm that takes U andh as given would solve
and the …rst-order condition is
Condition (7) states that, in equilibrium, the optimal training level, h =h; is such that the marginal cost of training is equal to the expected gain from a marginal increase in training.
By using the value function (4), the free entry condition (5), and the wage sharing rule (6), I have the following total surplus function
Making use of (1), (5), and (8), I obtain the equilibrium job creation condition
The evolution of unemployment over time is given by
In the steady-state, the unemployment rate is determined by
The model is recursive. Under the assumptions of production and cost functions, equation (7) gives the unique equilibrium level of trainingh. With knowledge ofh, the job creation condition (9) gives the solution for labor market tightness~ . And …nally, with~ , (10) gives equilibrium unemployment.
The Social Planner' s Problem
In order to consider the e¢ cient allocation in this economy, I analyze the social planner's problem. The e¢ cient allocation maximizes the output of the economy subject to search frictions. The social welfare function used by the social planner is
where y is average output per worker. The …rst and second terms of the bracket are total output in the economy. The third and fourth terms capture total cost: vacancy costs for …rms u and training costs q( )uC(h).
When the social planner chooses and h, he has to obey the evolution of unemployment given by
as well as the evolution of average output y is given by
The socially e¢ cient pair and h maximizes (11) subject to (12) and (13) . 4 In addition to (12) and (13), the optimal pair satis…es the following condition
where and are co-state variables. The above optimal conditions yield the following two equations that uniquely determine the socially e¢ cient and h:
where ( ) is the negative of the elasticity of q( ), and it is a number between 0 and 1. 4 I am looking for a steady-state solution and therefore suppress time dependence.
E¢ ciency
Now I study whether the decentralized economy could achieve e¢ ciency by comparing social optimal conditions (14) and (15) with the decentralized equilibrium conditions (9) and (7). If the training costs are not sunk when a …rm and a worker negotiate an initial wage, i.e., = 1, (7) and (15) are identical. Thus, the training level in the decentralized economy is e¢ cient. Setting = 1, the job creation condition in the decentralized economy (9) becomes
Comparing (14) with the above condition, it is easy to see that the two are identical if and only if = , which is the Hosios condition. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When = 1, the level of training is e¢ cient in the decentralized economy.
Furthermore, the decentralized economy is e¢ cient if and only if = .
Setting = 1 implies that wages are bargained before the training cost is incurred.
Thus, at the time of the initial wage determination, the training cost is not sunk. This Next, I consider the case of < 1. From (7) and (15), it is straightforward to show that the optimal training level in the decentralized economy is equal to or less than the e¢ cient training level. < 1 implies that wages are bargained after the training costs are incurred, i.e., the costs are completely or partially sunk at the time of wage determination. Since not all of the training costs are not shared with the worker, this leads to underinvestment in the decentralized economy. This ine¢ ciency can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the worker. Thus, if I set = 0, (7) will be identical to (15) and thus the level of training in the decentralized economy is e¢ cient. Let h denote the e¢ cient training level. Then, the job creation condition in the decentralized economy becomes
where 0 is the equilibrium labor market tightness in the the decentralized economy when = 0. Given the e¢ cient training level h , the e¢ cient labor market tightness can be obtained from (14) . Then, it is easy to see that < 0 , implying the unemployment rate in the decentralized economy is lower than the e¢ cient unemployment rate. The intuition is as follows. When < 1, there is contractual incompleteness that creates a hold-up problem for a …rm's investment in training. This can be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the workers. However, this, in turn, depresses wages and creates excessive entry of …rms, leading to ine¢ cient equilibrium unemployment rate. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When < 1, the optimal training level in the decentralized economy is equal to or less than the e¢ cient level. When = 0, the training level in the decentralized economy achieves e¢ ciency, but the decentralized equilibrium can never be e¢ cient.
This result is similar to the one obtained in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) that study the e¢ ciency of the search and matching model under the presence of match-speci…c investments. They demonstrate that there will be ine¢ ciency as long as investment costs are sunk, and ine¢ ciency can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the worker. While a …rm makes ex ante investments before matching with a worker in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) , in my model a …rm decides the level of investments after matching with a worker. Thus, this study shows that when investment costs are sunk, the timing of investments does not play an important role in this …nding.
Conclusion
Analyzing the e¢ ciency properties of the search and matching model is important not only a theoretically point of view but also in quantitative studies where the Hosios condition is sometimes used. This paper studies the e¢ ciency of the search and matching model with training costs. I introduce productivity enhancing …rm-speci…c skill training into the search and matching model of Pissarides (2000) . I demonstrate that while the decentralized economy can be e¢ cient if training costs are not sunk at the time of wage determination, the decentralized economy is not e¢ cient due to a hold-up problem if training costs are sunk.
